A college student, a soldier and an airman get on a train...

Sounds like the set up for  a joke. Except it's not. Three brave Americans, two of them servicemen got on a train. Hearing gunfire, they ran to the sound of guns and stopped a terrorist. The French have given them their highest honor. See the story here. But, to quote Abraham Lincoln, "the world will little note, nor long remember what we say" about these brave young Americans, "but, it can never forget what they did...." Spencer Stone, 23, Alek Skarlatos, 22, Anthony Sadler, 23 are brave and deserve to be long remembered for what they did. 

Subway Jared and justice?

Today, reading my facebook page, I came across one of my AFAM friends who was complaining that Jared, of Subway infamy, would serve no more than 12 years for his crimes as opposed to a black youth who was sentenced to 23 years for shooting a police dog. My AFAM friend was vexed at this and of course was raising a ruckus about the injustice of the apparent sentencing disparity. Of course, he blamed the whole thing on white privilege and a thoroughly fouled up justice system.

Some facts are in order. The black youth referenced is Ivins Rosier who was sixteen when he committed a burglary and killed the dog. The dog, was a retired police dog owned by a Florida State Highway Patrolman. Young Mr. Rosier is not a candidate for criminal mastermind. He was on juvenile probation for a previous burglary. As a part of his probation, he was required to wear an ankle monitor and he was on home arrest. He violated his home arrest by leaving to go burglarize the home of Robert Boody, the afore mentioned highway patrolman. Rosier joined up with some friends to do this burglary. When they got to Boody's home, they encountered a cantankerous German Shepard named Drake.

One of Rosier's cohort's shot Drake through a window. That allowed Rosier and his friends to enter the Boody home. Rosier went to the bedroom to look for loot. He didn't find much, but he did find the wounded Drake in the bathroom. Rosier admitted to shooting Drake another time, or two. Local police didn't have much difficulty linking Rosier to the burglary as his GPS equipped ankle monitor put him in the Boody home at the time of the burglary. For full details see this article.

Police obtained a warrant to arrest Rosier on the basis of the ankle monitor report and the burglary report. They arrested Rosier and took him into custody. In the police car, a Palm Beach County Detective engaged in some highly suggestive interrogation that convinced young Rosier that he was facing a long sentence for murder (untrue, Drake a dog doesn't come under the Florida Murder Statute) and that if he just confessed he could continue his high school studies and even go to college. (True only in the sense that Florida does offer education to convicts serving active sentences.) Despite the transparent untruths of what the detective was telling him, Rosier confessed and named his cohorts.

Subsequently, Rosier was waived into adult court. Why? Because he had exhausted juvenile court rehabilitation efforts. Rosier had a long juvenile record and had not been successfully rehabilitated. Thus, he left the juvenile court with no alternative but to waive him into adult court. There, he was convicted and sentenced to 23 years for armed burglary and animal cruelty. Sounds about right to me. Use a gun in the commission of a crime, kill a dog and burglarize a house - you need a long sentence to figure out what is wrong with your life.

Now to Jared Fogle, a creep indeed. Fogle is alleged to have traveled to New York to frequent young prostitutes, Some as young as Sixteen. For more sordid details, see the Indy Star. He allegedly asked one 17 year old prostitute to find him even younger prostitutes. Gross, and disgusting, no doubt. However, New York defines adults as being 16 and older. So, New York's statutory rape law does not apply to the crimes we know about. The worst that can be said of him is he frequented a prostitute. He also, going back to at least 2007 accessed kiddie porn on the internet. Another disgusting crime. Though not one of direct violence like Rosier's. Law enforcement was in something of a bind on Fogle's case. New York didn't have a felony to prosecute him with and lots of New Yorkers frequent prostitutes every day without being arrested. The kiddie porn is clearly a violation of federal and state law in Indiana. So, that's what they are hitting him with and throwing in the interstate travel to frequent a prostitute just to bump up the news factor of the case.

Does Fogle's, admittedly disgusting, crime spree compare with Rosier's? Not really. I think Rosier got a reasonable sentence for using a fire arm in the conduct of a felony. A very bad felony. And, frankly being about as dumb as a criminal can be. Fogle deserves serious prison time too, and he'll get it. Though not as much as Rosier and I can live with that too.

Walt-in-Durham

Intervening cause and Crystal Mangum.

Over at Sid's blog, a number of posters, well just two really, continue to misunderstand  and mis-apply the law. In fact, Sid is the worst of the bunch. I think a review of the case law is appropriate in this unhappy matter.

The general facts, most beneficial to the defendant are that Crystal Mangum got in an argument with Reginald Daye. During the course of that argument, Crystal armed herself with a steak knife and used it to stab Daye in the flank. Crystal made good her escape after stabbing Daye. Daye sought medical treatment from paramedics. Ultimately he ended up in Duke University Hospital and was operated on. Daye, was admitted in an intoxicated state, but the operation was initially thought successful. However, some days after the operation, Daye was assessed as in need of intubation. The initial intubation was esophageal and did not restore adequate air flow. Daye was re-intubated and this did restore airflow. After some time passed, Daye had no brain function and his family elected to remove him from life support. Thereafter he died.

Issue

When will an intervening act halt criminal liability?

Rule

A defendant will be held criminally responsible for second-degree murder if [her] act caused or directly contributed to the victim's death. State v. Jordan, 333 N.C. 431, 439, 426 S.E.2d 692, 697 (1993),  State v. Welch, 135 N.C. App. 499 at 503, 521 S.E.2d 266 at ___ (1999). To escape responsibility based on an intervening cause, the defendant must show the intervening cause was "the sole cause of death." Sate v. Holsclaw, 42 N.C. App. 696 at 699, 257 S.E.2d 650 at 652 (1979).

Application

In Welch, the court reasoned: "Defendant contends, based on the testimony of Dr. Stanton, that Lemmons' refusal to accept a blood transfusion was an independent and intervening cause of death, such as to cut off any responsibility defendant may have in the victim's death. However, it is clear from the evidence that Lemmons' act in declining a blood transfusion was not "the sole cause" of death." Id. Indeed, all of Lemmons' injuries resulted from the stabbing inflicted by defendant. Thus, but for defendant's act, Lemmons would not have been in need of a blood transfusion."

In Daye's case, Sid, not Crystal, contends that the esophageal intubation was the intervening cause of death, such as to cut off any responsibility Crystal may have in Daye's death. However, as in Welch, Daye would not have been in the hospital but for Crystal's stabbing of him. He would not have needed surgery. He would not have needed an intubation. Thus, as in Welch, but for the defendant's act, Daye would not have died.

Conclusion

The jury got it right. Daye's death was the result of Crystal's stabbing. Understand, Crystal's lawyers have grasped this since Dr. Roberts gave her report. That's why they refused to raise the issue at trial and they refused to raise the issue on appeal. 

Walt-in-Durham

New York defamation law survey.

New York uses different words than Virginia discussed earlier. New York calls it, defamation. Further, New York uses a common law approach rather than the mixed statutory and common law approach we are familiar from Virginia. Under New York's common law, the elements of a defamation claim are:

1. a false statement;
2. published to a third party without privilege or authorization;
3. with fault amounting to at least negligence;
4. that caused special harm or defamation per se.

See Dillon v. City of New York, 261 A.D.2d 34, 38 (N.Y.A.D. 1 Dept. 1999).

            New York courts rely heavily on the "vortex" notion of a limited-purpose public figure. See James v. Gannett Co., Inc., 40 N.Y.2d 415 (N.Y. 1976) ("The essential element underlying the category of public figures is that the publicized person has taken an affirmative step to attract public attention."). "A person becomes a limited-purpose public figure only if he voluntarily "draw[s] attention to himself" or uses his position in the controversy "as a fulcrum to create public discussion." Wolston v. Reader's Digest Association, 443 U.S. 157, 168 (1979). He must, therefore, "thrust himself into the vortex of [the] public issue [and] engage the public's attention in an attempt to influence its outcome." See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 352 (1974). In New York, such figures have included candidates for public office, restaurants (for the purpose of food reviews), and religious groups. The latter category may make Phi Kappa Psi's case under New York law more difficult.

            When the plaintiff in a defamation lawsuit is a private figure and the allegedly defamatory statements relate to a matter of legitimate public concern, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant acted "in a grossly irresponsible manner without due consideration for the standards of information gathering and dissemination ordinarily followed by responsible parties." Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, 38 N.Y.S.2d 196, 199 (N.Y. 1975). This standard, which is a higher bar than negligence but lower than actual malice, focuses on an objective evaluation of the defendant's actions rather than looking at the defendant's state of mind at the time of publication. In a New York court, or a court applying New York law, the Columbia review of the Rolling Stone story might provide the evidence necessary for a jury to conclude the story was an example of a grossly irresponsible conduct without due consideration for the standards of information gathering and dissemination ordinarily followed by responsible parties.

At least one court has found that the same standard of fault applies to citizen or non-media defendants where the allegedly defamatory statements relate to a matter of legitimate public concern. See Pollnow v. Poughkeepsie Newspapers, 107 A.D.2d 10 (N.Y.A.D. 2d Dep't 1985), aff'd 67 N.Y.2d 778 (N.Y. 1986) (no liability for letter to the editor unless writer was "grossly irresponsible"). I think rape is one of those matters of legitimate public concern that might tempt a New York court to apply the higher standard. In cases brought by private figure plaintiffs involving statements not related to a matter of legitimate public concern, New York courts apply a negligence standard.

            To determine whether statements relate to a matter of legitimate public concern, New York courts view the allegedly defamatory statements in context of the writing as a whole. They ask whether the matter can be "fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern of the community" and distinguish this broad category of newsworthy matters from "mere gossip and prurient interest." Overall, the test is deferential to the reporter's judgment about whether a matter is of legitimate public concern. See Huggins v. Moore, 94 N.Y.2d 296, 302-03 (N.Y. 1999).

            New York courts recognize a number of privileges and defenses in the context of defamation actions, including the fair report privilege, the opinion and fair comment privileges, substantial truth, and the wire service defense. New York has not explicitly recognized or rejected the neutral reportage privilege.

            There also is an important provision under section 230 of the Communications Decency Act that may protect you if a third party – not you or your employee or someone acting under your direction – posts something on your blog or website that is defamatory. We cover this protection in more detail in the section on Publishing the Statements and Content of Others.

            Most of the privileges and defenses to defamation can be defeated if the plaintiff proves that the defendant acted with actual malice. The fair report privilege is the exception to this rule; it cannot be defeated by a showing of actual malice.

            New York has codified the fair report privilege into law. N.Y. Civ. Rights § 74. Under the statute, speakers cannot be held liable for giving a "fair and true report of any judicial proceeding, legislative proceeding or other official proceeding." A report is "fair and true" if it is substantially accurate. The Columbia review and the Charlottesville Police report show that the Rolling Stone story is far from accurate. In fact, Columbia could not substantiate any fact alleged in the article as accurate.

            New York recognizes a privilege that is similar to the wire service defense but explicitly extends protection to content originating from other sources in addition to wire services. Jewell v. NYP Holdings, Inc., 23 F.Supp.2d 348 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). Under the privilege, courts will not hold republishers liable for reproducing defamatory content unless the republisher had or should have had "substantial reasons" to question the content's accuracy or the original speaker's good faith and reporting practices. See Karaduman v. Newsday, Inc., 51 N.Y.2d 531 (N.Y. 1980). Because courts applying these principles have dealt exclusively with traditional media entities such as newspapers and book publishers -- both as publishers and republishers -- it is not clear whether this privilege would apply to online speakers such as bloggers and citizen media websites.

            The status of the neutral reportage privilege in New York is not settled. The New York Court of Appeals has neither recognized nor rejected the privilege, and the lower courts disagree on whether it is part of New York law.

            The statute of limitations for defamation in New York in one (1) year. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 215(3). New York has adopted the single publication rule. See Gregoire v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 298 N.Y. 119 (1948).  The single publication rule applies to the Internet in New York, with the statute of limitations running from the time the defamatory content first appears online. "Republication" of the allegedly defamatory content will restart the statute of limitations. A "republication" occurs upon "a separate aggregate publication from the original, on a different occasion, which is not merely 'a delayed circulation of the original edition.'" Firth v. State, 775 N.E.2d 463, 466 (N.Y. 2002). The New York Court of appeals has indicated that altering the allegedly defamatory content may trigger republication, and a lower court has held that moving web content to a different web address triggered republication. See Firth v. State, 306 A.D.2d 666 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003). Regardless of the New York single publication rule and Firth, I would say that time is of the essence in this matter.

With many thanks to the Digital Media Law Project. 

Walt-in-Durham

Some thoughts and law on the issue of libel as it applies to the U.Va. rape hoax in the pages of the Rolling Stone. 

VVa. Code. Ann. §8.01-45 Action for insulting words.

·                                 All words shall be actionable which from their usual construction and common acceptance are construed as insults and tend to violence and breach of the peace.

            The Virginia statute arose out of Virginia's long history of dueling. "Although application of [§8.01-45] is no longer confined to its original purpose of preventing duels, it has been interpreted by Virginia courts to be virtually co-extensive with the common-law action for defamation. For this reason any constitutional limitations that apply to the plaintiffs’ defamation action must necessarily apply to their “insulting words” claim as well." Potomac Valve & Fitting, Inc. v. Crawford Fitting Co., 829 F.2d 1280, 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 12607 (4th Cir. Va. 1987). Va. Code. Ann. §8.01-45 only penalizes words used in a verbal attack directed at a particular individual in a face to face confrontation that presents a clear and present danger of a violent physical reaction. Thompson v. Town of Front Royal, No. 5:98CV00083, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3876 (W.D. Va. Mar. 16, 2000). Thompson calls directly into question the ability of a group to bring an action under Va. Code. Ann. §8.01-45. However, The Thompson court's statement that Va. Code. Ann. §8.01-45 only applies to individuals is dicta. That is, the Thompson court is ruling on a statute of limitations matter and it is not faced with a corporate plaintiff. Thompson is the only Virginia case I could locate that alleges this limitation. I would say that a strong argument could be made that Virginia should follow the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 564A standard, set forth as: "One who publishes defamatory matter concerning a group or class of persons is subject to liability to an individual member of it if, but only if,

(a) the group or class is so small that the matter can reasonably be understood to refer to the member, or

(b) the circumstances of publication reasonably give rise to the conclusion that there is particular reference to the member. . . ." "[Va. Code Ann. §8.01-45] plainly requires that the words used must not only be insults, but they must also “tend to violence and breach of the peace.” Allen & Rocks, Inc. v. Dowell, 252 Va. 439, 477 S.E.2d 741, 1996 Va. LEXIS 107 (Va. 1996). The Allen court is strongly reverting back to the original purpose of the statute, to provide an alternate to dueling. If not incite to violence, then no recovery. Here, there was a measure of violence directed at the Phi Kappa Psi fraternity house, including smashed windows, bricks or other heavy objects thrown at the building and people living within, angry protests outside the house requiring police presence and graffiti painted on the building.

            As a matter of state law the negligence standard should be applicable to media and nonmedia defendants alike. Gazette, Inc. v. Harris, 229 Va. 1, 325 S.E.2d 713, 54 A.L.R.4th 685, 1985 Va. LEXIS 171 (Va. 1985), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1032, 105 S. Ct. 3513, 87 L. Ed. 2d 643, 1985 U.S. LEXIS 2356 (U.S. 1985) cert. denied, 473 U.S. 905, 105 S. Ct. 3528, 87 L. Ed. 2d 653, 1985 U.S. LEXIS 2499 (U.S. 1985). The application of this negligence standard is expressly limited, however, to circumstances where the defamatory statement makes substantial danger to reputation apparent. The trial judge shall make such determination as a matter of law. If, on the other hand, no substantial danger to reputation is apparent from the statement in issue, New York Times malice must be established to recover compensatory damages. Gazette, Inc. v. Harris, 229 Va. 1, 325 S.E.2d 713, 54 A.L.R.4th 685, 1985 Va. LEXIS 171 (Va. 1985), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1032, 105 S. Ct. 3513, 87 L. Ed. 2d 643, 1985 U.S. LEXIS 2356 (U.S. 1985), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 905, 105 S. Ct. 3528, 87 L. Ed. 2d 653, 1985 U.S. LEXIS 2499 (U.S. 1985).

            "In an action brought by a private individual to recover actual, compensatory damages for a defamatory publication, the plaintiff may recover upon proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the publication was false, and that the defendant either knew it to be false, or believing it to be true, lacked reasonable grounds for such belief, or acted negligently in failing to ascertain the facts on which the publication was based. Under this standard, truth no longer is an affirmative defense to be established by the defendant. Instead, the plaintiff must prove falsity, because he is required to establish negligence with respect to such falsity. Such liability may be based upon negligence, whether or not the publication in question relates to a matter of public or general concern." Gazette, Inc. v. Harris, 229 Va. 1, 325 S.E.2d 713, 54 A.L.R.4th 685, 1985 Va. LEXIS 171 (Va. 1985), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1032, 105 S. Ct. 3513, 87 L. Ed. 2d 643, 1985 U.S. LEXIS 2356 (U.S. 1985), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 905, 105 S. Ct. 3528, 87 L. Ed. 2d 653, 1985 U.S. LEXIS 2499 (U.S. 1985).

            One of the key issues in the Rolling Stone article is Sabrina Rueben Erdely's failure to verify negative statements about people in her story. The Virginia Supreme Court in a very similar case addressed the issue. "In a defamation action brought by a school teacher against newspaper reporter and his employer, where a number of supervisors, a fellow teacher, and students, including some classmates of the complaining students, testified as to plaintiff’s good qualities as a teacher and contradicted virtually all the negative statements made by the persons the reporter interviewed, the students who contradicted the negative testimony were all shown to have been readily available for interview in the Richmond area, while the school authorities would not furnish the reporter with the names or addresses of other students in plaintiff’s classes, the jury could have inferred from the evidence that the reporter could have obtained this information from the students he interviewed but negligently failed to do so, and, in fact, one student gave the reporter the names of some of the other students, but the reporter apparently did nothing with the information, the jury had ample evidence from which to conclude that a reasonably prudent news reporter writing the article could readily have contacted a number of other students to verify (or contradict) these accusations and should have done so." Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Lipscomb, 234 Va. 277, 362 S.E.2d 32, 1987 Va. LEXIS 260 (Va. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1023, 108 S. Ct. 1997, 100 L. Ed. 2d 228, 1988 U.S. LEXIS 2315 (U.S. 1988).

            "Words that impute the commission of a crime that is punishable by imprisonment in a state or federal institution are actionable per se." Schnupp v. Smith, 249 Va. 353, 457 S.E.2d 42, 1995 Va. LEXIS 53 (Va. 1995). In this story, Erdely alleged actions that constituted rape and failure to report crimes. In Virginia Code Ann. § 18.2-61 provides for a mandatory minimum sentence for rape of five years and a maximum of life in prison. The Rolling Stone made allegations of rape. According to the Virginia Supreme Court, those are actionable per se. That means, the case will survive a motion to dismiss and the jury will be instructed the same.

            In this case, there is expert evidence of the standard for investigative reports. However, Virginia does not require that. "The trial court did not err in excluding evidence from an expert witness, a nationally known journalist, proffered on the standards for investigative reporting. A jury in this state is as competent as any expert to form an intelligent and accurate opinion as to whether a reporter should have conducted additional investigations. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Lipscomb, 234 Va. 277, 362 S.E.2d 32, 1987 Va. LEXIS 260 (Va. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1023, 108 S. Ct. 1997, 100 L. Ed. 2d 228, 1988 U.S. LEXIS 2315 (U.S. 1988).

            Jurisdiction might be a problem . The Fourth Circuit and the Virginal Supreme court have held: "It is not the place where the libelous article is printed, but the place where it is published and circulated, that makes the words actionable under this section." Haskell v. Bailey, 63 F. 873, 1894 U.S. App. LEXIS 2450 (4th Cir. Va. 1894). Where a "defendant, in Virginia, wrote a letter to a third party in Washington, D.C., containing defamatory statements about the plaintiff. Plaintiff questioned defendant in Virginia in regard to the letter and defendant substantially repeated and assumed responsibility for the contents of the letter when he admitted its authorship and said to defendant that the letter spoke for itself. The defendant was liable in Virginia under this statute as he reiterated the insulting words to plaintiff in Virginia." Davis v. Heflin, 130 Va. 169, 107 S.E. 673, 1921 Va. LEXIS 148 (Va. 1921).

            Under Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-45, "malice, either express or implied, is essential to a recovery for slander or for insulting words, but actual or express malice need not be proved except as a basis for punitive damages. For the latter purpose it is indispensable." Windsor v. Carlton, 136 Va. 652, 118 S.E. 222, 1923 Va. LEXIS 112 (Va. 1923). Not the Va. Supreme Court's best effort at clarity. However, I think the court is saying that malice is only required for punitive damages. The court has also held that for insulting words made actionable by the statute, "it is not necessary to prove actual or pecuniary loss." Weatherford v. Birchett, 158 Va. 741, 164 S.E. 535, 1932 Va. LEXIS 294 (Va. 1932). "The law presumes that damages result from the utterance of insulting words, made actionable by the statute, just as it does where the words uttered are actionable per se. It is not necessary in either case in order to recover, to prove actual or pecuniary loss." Boyd v. Boyd, 116 Va. 326, 82 S.E. 110 (1914); W.T. Grant Co. v. Owens, 149 Va. 906, 141 S.E. 860 (1928). See also, Jordan v. Melville Shoe Corp., 150 Va. 101, 142 S.E. 387, 1928 Va. LEXIS 298 (Va. 1928). "In an action, under this section, there is no rule of law fixing the measure of damages, nor can it be reached by any process of computation." Boyd v. Boyd, 116 Va. 326, 82 S.E. 110, 1914 Va. LEXIS 36 (Va. 1914). "The amount of the damages is to be measured by the prejudice sustained by the plaintiff."  Moseley v. Moss, 47 Va. 534, 1850 Va. LEXIS 5 (Va. 1850). There is no fixed standard for measuring exemplary or punitive damages, and the amount of the award is largely a matter of discretion with the jury. Old Dominion Branch 496 v. Austin, 213 Va. 377, 192 S.E.2d 737 (1972). "While there is no rule fixing the quantum of compensation for insult, mental suffering, and injury to the reputation of the plaintiff or for punishment of the offender, one of unblemished reputation is entitled to greater damages than one whose reputation is such that he is little hurt from the action of which complaint is made. The effect of bad reputation is to reduce the damage inflicted." Stubbs v. Cowden, 179 Va. 190, 18 S.E.2d 275, 1942 Va. LEXIS 211 (Va. 1942).

Walt-in-Durham

The Duke/Harr litigation continues on.

As many of you know, Sid Harr is a perpetual litigant when it comes to Duke University. He has now sued them twice over the same incident where he was told to leave campus. He lost the first time because he didn't have a legal theory to support his rather absurd claim. He later published a tape recording of the incident which made Duke look reasonable. Never one to be deterred, he sued them again using the same theory that the United States Supreme Court found to be without merit. Of course, you can't do that under our law, or anyone else's for that matter. Sid, never one to let the law or the facts stand in his way did file again. And, as you might imagine, he lost in the U.S. District Court. Of course he appealed. But, this time he was late with his filing. The 4th Circuit denied his appeal on the grounds that he was late in filing and he'd had his opportunity to fully litigate once and already lost. So, what does Sid do? He asks the 4th Circuit to review the case en banc! Here's Sid's petition.

It makes for humorous reading if not particularly enlightening reading. Sid entitles his reasons as "exceptional" thus commanding the full court's attention. First, he confuses state and federal court. And then he ignores the well settled law surrounding FRCP 12(b)(6). Without citing to authority, he tries to raise the fact that Professor Mike Adams was ultimately granted a trial after the District Court dismissed his case under FRCP 12(b)(6) as a reason the 4th Circuit should do the same for him. As usual, Sid demonstrates a complete lack of understanding of the law. He simply wants a jury trial because Mike Adams got one.

Once he's finished with Adams, Sid decides to insult a sitting District Court Judge and Magistrate, without any proof what so ever. I think Sid's paranoia is getting in the way of his ability to reason. This part of the petition is not funny, it is just sad and mean.

Of course, Sid has to complain about his being denied access to the District Court's law library. What he ignores is he can go to the NCCU law library and look at all the materials he wants. Of course letting Sid in a law library would be a waste of resources as he never pays attention to the law.

Finished with his complaints about the law library situation, Sid decides it's a good idea to engage in  a few more gratuitous insults directed at the District Court Judges and Magistrates. Again, very mean spirited. Finally, Sid closes with his theory that everyone, including the media is involved in a conspiracy against him and Crystal Mangum.

Sid and Duke deserve this perpetual litigation. But, the judges and magistrates don't, neither do the taxpayers of North Carolina. The 4th Circuit will dispatch his petition because the court below was correct that he filed late. And, the three judge panel that ruled so, is also correct.

Walt-in-Durham

Heads have rolled? Well, not many.

UNC Chancellor Little Carol Folt, from Dartmouth don't you know, said heads would roll as a result of the expensive Wainstein report. Well, our friends at WNCN are now reporting on the names of six who were terminated.

The most ironic is Jeanette Boxill, Ph.D. Ms. Boxill was the director of the Parr Center for Ethics. A touch of irony in an otherwise depressing tale. Boxill lost her job with the Parr Center and Little Carol has terminated her from the University. Of course Boxill is appealing. An appeal from the ethically challenged director of the center for ethics.

The rest of the terminees seem to be middle and low level employees, only one one other professor, non-tenure track at that, among the bunch. Timothy J. McMillan, a senior lecturer was let go. He admitted to Wainstein that he should have known what was going on. But, he claims he didn't and he says he did nothing to stop it. Well, thanks Mr. McMillan for your diligence. Don't let the door hit you on the way out.

To its credit, UNC-Wilmington, UNC-by-the-sea, let go an academic adviser who was identified in the Wainstein report and disclosed that name promptly in accordance with North Carolina law.

Walt-in-Durham